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Every worker has the right to protection against unjustified dismissal, in accordance with 
Union law and national laws and practices. 
Explanation on Article 30  
This Article draws on Article 24 of the revised Social Charter. See also Directive 
(& RQ WKH VDIHJXDUGLQJ RI HPSOR\HHV¶ ULJKWV LQ WKH HYHQW RI WUDQVIHUV RI
undertakings, and Directive 80/987/EEC on the protection of employees in the event of 
the insolvency of their employer, as amended by Directive 2002/74/EC. 
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A. Article 30 and the Scope of EU Law 
 
Article 153(1)(d) TFEU provides a specific legal basis for the adoption of directives in 
WKHILHOGRIµSURWHFWLRQRIZRUNHUVZKHUHWKHLUHPSOR\PHQWFRQWUDFWLVWHUPLQDWHG¶.1 This 
provision originated in the Social Policy Agreement annexed to the Treaty of Maastricht, 
1993, and was later incorporated into the EC Treaty by the Treaty of Amsterdam, 1999, 
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but it remains dormant twenty years on. As a result, Article 30 lacks the bite that would 
otherwise be provided by a comprehensive normative framework in EU law to protect 
µHYHU\ZRUNHU¶DJDLQVWµunjustified dismissal¶. However, there are many interactions with 
EU legislation, Charter provisions and international norms that, in combination, have the 
potential to bring Article 30 within the scope of EU law in certain situations. 
 There are several reasons for the (8¶V IDLOXUH WR DGRSW D VSHFLILF GLUHFWLYH RQ
unjust dismissal, which, taken together, shine a light on some of the difficulties in 
converting Article 30 into a fully-fledged job security right for all workers within the 
scope of EU law. Firstly, there is a requirement of unanimity in the Council for the 
adoption of specific directives to protect workers on the termination of their employment 
contract. Even after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, 2009, the Member States 
have shown little desire to support legislation at EU level. Regulation of termination of 
employment is one of only three fields of social policy listed in Article 153(1) TFEU to 
fall outside the ordinary legislative procedure.2 Secondly, the Community Charter of the 
Fundamental Social Rights of Workers (EU Social Charter),3 which provided the primary 
stimulus for legislative social activism in the 1990s, contains no express reference to the 
general protection of workers in the event of termination of employment. Thirdly, and by 
way of explanation for the above omission, such a right is also absent from the European 
Social Charter (ESC), 1961.4 This gap in protection was not rectified until the Revised 
European Social Charter (RESC), 1996,5 but, as of 26 March 2013, only 18 of the EU-28 
had ratified the RESC.6 Moreover, ILO Convention No 158 on Termination of 
Employment, 1982, which was the primary source for Article 24 RESC, has attracted just 
ten ratifications from among the EU Member States.7  Fourthly, the Commission has 
lacked the political will to bring forward a legislative proposal on termination of 
employment because it has found it difficult to provide a compelling rationale, on its own 
terms, for a proposal rooted in job security over a period when the driving dynamic of EU 
social SROLF\ KDV IDYRXUHG µODERXU PDUNHW IOH[LELOLW\¶ DQG µOLJKW WRXFK¶ UHJXODWLRQ. By 
2006, the Commission was postulating the notion that the µWUDGLWLRQDOPRGHO¶RI ODERXU
law based on protection for the µVWDQGDUG¶ contractual employee in a particular job was 
outdated.8 Instead, the Commission favours more inclusive, but diluted, protection for all 
workers in an increasingly diverse and fragmented labour market and managing 
employment transitions from one status to another.  
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 7KH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VLQHUWLD can, in part, be explained by the general ambiguity of 
the right itself. The right to protection against unjust dismissal is an essentially defensive 
right to protect the worker against the abuse of managerial power.9 It can apply in the 
context of termination of employment connected with the capacity or conduct of the 
worker or an economic dismissal.10 Legislation on job security may deter or prevent the 
employer from simply firing at will, as is the norm in the United States,11 and, in some 
Member States, there is the possibility of reinstatement in the job.  
 It is also important to note that the scope of Article 30 is limited somewhat by the 
caveat that the operation of the right to protection against unjustified dismissal is in 
accordance with both Union law and µnational laws and practices¶$FFRUGLQJWR$UWLFOH
 RI WKH &KDUWHU µ)XOO DFFRXQW VKDOO EH WDNHQ RI QDWLRQDO ODZV DQG SUDFWLFHV as 
VSHFLILHGLQWKH&KDUWHU¶ZKLFKPHDQVE\UHIHUHQFHWRWKHH[SODQDWLRQRQ$UWLFOHWKDW
WKHµVSLULWRIVXEVLGLDULW\¶DSSOLHV7KHH[WHQWWRZKLFKWKLVUHVWULFWVWKHVFRpe of Article 
30 is doubtful but, at the very least, it ensures that where the national law and practice 
falls outside the scope of application of the Charter, as defined in Article 51, or action by 
Member States is merely optional under EU law, or indeed international law, Article 30 
will not be directly engaged.  
 Moreover, Article 2 of Protocol 30 on the application of the Charter to Poland and 
the United Kingdom, annexed to the EU treaties, may also come into play as it provides 
that ZKHUHµQDWLRQDOODZVDQGSUDFWLFHV¶DUHUHIHUUHGWo in a provision of the Charter the 
right in question shall only apply in the two named Member States µWRWKHH[WHQWWKDWWKH
rights or principles that it contains are recognised in the law or practices of Poland and 
the UnitHG .LQJGRP¶. This reinforces Article 1(2) of the Protocol which declares that 
µQRWKLQJ¶LQ7LWOH,9RIWKH&KDUWHUZKLFKLQFOXGHV$UWLFOHµFUHDWHVMXVWLFLDEOHULJKWV¶
DSSOLFDEOH WR 3RODQG RU WKH 8QLWHG .LQJGRP µH[FHSW LQ VR IDU DV 3RODQG RU WKH 8QLWHG
.LQJGRPKDVSURYLGHGIRUVXFKULJKWVLQLWVQDWLRQDOODZ¶7KHOLPLWHGVFRSHRI Article 30 
suggests that the impact of the Protocol is not significant but it does act as a potential 
brake on the development of EU law in this area. It is important to note, however, that the 
Protocol is not an opt-out and it does not exempt Poland or the United Kingdom from the 
obligation to comply with the provisions of the Charter or to prevent a court of one of 
those Member States from ensuring compliance with those provisions.12 
 EU law does, however, offer a degree of protection to individual workers in the 
event of termination of their contract or employment relationship in several specific 
contexts. There is, therefore, the potential for Article 30 be activated and for its sources in 
international law to be a point of reference for judicial interpretation within the scope of 
EU law.  
 The Transfers of Undertakings Directive, 2001/23,13 first adopted in 1977, is 
referenced in the explanations on Article 30. It is intended to safeguard the acquired 
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employment rights of contracted employees in the event of a business restructuring 
involving a change of employer. It offers protection only in the context of the termination 
of an employment relationship by reason of the transfer of an undertaking, business, or 
part thereof to another employer as a result of a legal transfer or merger.14 Article 4(1) 
SURYLGHV WKDW WKH WUDQVIHU VKDOO QRW µLQ LWVHOI¶ FRQVWLWXWH JURXQGV IRU GLVPLVVDO E\ WKH
transferor or the transferee. It does, however, allow for dismissals that may take place for 
µHFRQRPLF WHFKQLFDO RU RUJDQLVDWLRQDO UHDVRQV HQWDLOLQJ FKDQJHV LQ WKH ZRUNIRUFH¶. It 
therefore balances protection for the employees with the commercial considerations of 
the transferor and the transferee. Article 4(2) is more explicit on the justice of the 
dismissal. It provides that if the employment contract is terminated because the transfer 
involves a µVXEVWDQWLDOFKDQJH¶LQZRUNLQJFRQGLWLRQVWRWKHµGHWULPHQW¶RIWKHHPSOR\HH
WKHHPSOR\HUµVKDOOEHUHJDUGHGDVKDYLQJEHHQUHVSRQVLEOH¶IRUWKHWHUPLQDWLRQ 
 Reference is also made in the explanations on Article 30 to the Insolvency 
Directive, 2008/94/EC,15 first introduced in 1980. The Directive is primarily concerned 
ZLWK HQVXULQJ D µPLQLPXP GHJUHH¶ RI SURWHFWLRQ IRU HPSOR\HHV LQ WKH HYHQW RI WKH
insolvency of their employer.16 Member States are required to establish a body which 
guarantees payment of the outstanding contractual claims of employees. Under Article 3, 
these payments are to include, where provided for by national law, µVHYHUDQFHSD\¶RQ
termination of employment relationships. The purpose is to provide a modicum of 
compensation by society for the unfairness suffered by employees in economic 
circumstances for which they cannot be held to be responsible. Fundamental rights are 
not at the forefront and it is noticeable that neither the Directive, as amended, nor the 
Charter, contains a reference to Article 25 RESC which recognises a µULJKWRIZRUNHUV to 
WKHSURWHFWLRQRIWKHLUFODLPVLQWKHHYHQWRIWKHLQVROYHQF\RIWKHLUHPSOR\HU¶ 
 Unlike in the case of the Transfers of Undertaking Directive, there is no new 
employer to take over the ownership of the business in an insolvency scenario, but 
Article 8 recognises acquired rights, or a property dimension to the job, by placing an 
obligation on 0HPEHU6WDWHVWRWDNHWKHµQHFHVVDU\PHDVXUHV¶WRSURWHFWERWKHPSOR\HHV
and persons who have already left the undertaking or business at the date of the onset of 
WKH HPSOR\HU¶V LQVROYHQF\ LQ UHVSHFW RI ULJKWV FRQIHUULQJ RQ WKHP LPPHGLDWH RU
prospective entitlement to old-age benefits, LQFOXGLQJ VXUYLYRUV¶ EHQHILWV XQGHU
occupational pensions schemes. 
 In both of the above examples, Article 30 has the potential to buttress the 
established rights of employees on termination of employment under EU law. It can be 
argued that Article 30 is somewhat incidental to the main purposes of these directives, 
which are essentially concerned with managing the processes of corporate restructuring 
and insolvency. This may explain why the Court of Justice has not, to date, cited Article 
30 in its judgments in cases referred by the national courts on the scope of the 
employment protection provisions in either of the two directives. The Court of Justice 
                                                                                                                                                                             
parts of undertakings or businesses, OJ L 82, 22.3.2001, p 16. The Directive repealed and replaced 
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and 2002/74/EC. 
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has, however, made reference to Article 16 of the Charter laying down the freedom to 
conduct a business when exercising the managerial prerogative in the context of a 
transfer of an undertaking.17 
 The explanations make no reference to the Collective Redundancies Directive, 
98/59,18 despite the fact that, alone among EU social policy directives, it is concerned 
exclusively with the process of termination of the employment relationship. Directive 
98/59 applies in situations where an employer decides to cease to run a business at a 
particular location or to reduce the number of employees employed there.19 In part, this 
omission can be explained by the essentially procedural objectives of the Directive, 
which is not directly concerned with the substantive employment rights of those workers 
who might potentially be affected when an employer contemplates making collective 
redundancies. The main purpose of the Directive is to provide a loose framework within 
which the parties, including representatives of the employer and the workers, can conduct 
the SUDFWLFDODUUDQJHPHQWVDQGSURFHGXUHVIRUVXFKµFROOHFWLYHUHGXQGDQFLHV¶. As such, it 
fits more closely with Article 27 of the Charter on the right of workers to µinformation 
DQG FRQVXOWDWLRQ ZLWKLQ WKH XQGHUWDNLQJ¶ Nevertheless, Article 30 is relevant because 
HIIHFWLYH LQYROYHPHQWRIZRUNHUV¶ UHSUHVHQWDWLYHV LV RIYLWDO LPSortance for individuals 
facing dismissal as a consequence of economic re-organisation. 
 Specific prohibition of dismissal from employment can be found in EU legislation 
concerning family life. Article 10 of the Pregnancy and Maternity Directive, 1992/85,20 
prohibits the dismissal of pregnant workers and workers who have recently given birth or 
are breastfeeding. Dismissal of these workers is deemed automatically unjustified without 
the need to look at motive or to use EU gender equality law to establish unequal 
treatment. 7KHOHJLVODWRU¶VUDWLRQDOHLVWKHQHed to guarantee the right of workers falling 
within the scope of the Directive to health and safety protection.   
 Clause 2(4) of the revised Framework Agreement annexed to the Parental Leave 
Directive, 2010/18,21 UHTXLUHV0HPEHU6WDWHVWRWDNHWKHµQHFHVVDU\PHDVXUHV¶WRSURWHFW
workers against dismissal on the grounds of an application for, or taking of, parental 
leave in accordance with national law, collective agreements or practices. In a similar 
vein, Article 16 of the recast Directive on Equal Treatment of Men and Women, 
2006/54,22 provides for protection against dismissal for workers exercising rights to 
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 Council Directive 92/85/EEC on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety 
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(tenth individual Directive within the meaning of Article 16 (1) of Directive 89/391/EEC), OJ L 348, 
28.11.1992, p 1. 
21
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parental leave concluded by BUSINESSEUROPE, UEAPME, CEEP and ETUC and repealing Directive 
96/34/EC, OJ L 68, 18.3.2010, p 13. 
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paternity and/or adoption leave but only where such rights are recognised by Member 
States. 
 Each of these family life related dismissal scenarios is captured by Article 33(2) 
of the Charter. It is important to note, however, the link between the specific protections 
provided in these directives and the importance, in the wider sense, of upholding the 
principles of dignity and autonomy of the individual that are central to the conception of 
fairness in dismissal.23 
 Finally, Article 30 is relevant in protection against dismissal in the context of 
combating discrimination on one or more of the grounds referred to in Article 19 TFEU24 
and providing for equal treatment between men and women in employment and 
occupation under Article 157 TFEU. Article 14(1)(c) of the recast Directive on Equal 
Treatment of Men and Women, 2006/54,25 prohibits direct or indirect discrimination in 
UHODWLRQ WR HPSOR\PHQW DQG ZRUNLQJ FRQGLWLRQV µLQFOXGLQJ GLVPLVVDOV¶ Equivalent 
provisions can be found in Article 3(1)(c) of Directive 2000/4326 on race discrimination 
and Article 3(1)(c) of the general non-discrimination Directive, 2000/78.27 Moreover, 
dismissal for reasons connected with discrimination is not valid under the norms of the 
ILO and the Council of Europe on protection in the event of termination of employment 
initiated by the employer.28  
 On the one hand, Article 30 appears somewhat nugatory in the non-discrimination 
and equal treatment context as it is superseded by more direct application of Articles 21 
and 23 of the Charter. However, on the other hand, it may have particular relevance in the 
context of age discrimination where, by contrast with the other grounds of discrimination, 
directly discriminatory dismissal rules, such as a fixed retirement age, are capable of 
justification by an employer who can show that the provisions in question are 
µREMHFWLYHO\DQGUHDVRQDEO\MXVWified by a legitimate aim¶DQGSURSRUWLRQDWH.29  
 
B. Interrelationship of Article 30 with other provisions of the Charter 
 
In order to identify the relationship of Article 30 with other Charter provisions, it is 
necessary to conceptualise justice in the context of dismissal by an employer. Hugh 
Collins has identified two rationales for laws against unjust or unfair dismissal.30 Firstly, 
by providing for fairness in the process and substance of dismissal, such laws respect the 
dignity of the individual worker and, secondly, they foster autonomy by improving a 
ZRUNHU¶VMREVHFXULW\ The granting of the right endows the worker with an interest in job 
security but not necessarily an ownership or property right in the job. 
 &ROOLQV¶ dignity rationale is immediately relevant when Article 1 is considered. 
Article 1 declares that human dignity iV µLQYLRODEOH¶ DQG µPXVW EH UHVSHFWHG DQG
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 See Collins, above n9, 9-23. 
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 Sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation. 
25
 See above n22. 
26
 Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between 
persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, OJ L 180, 19.7.2000, p 22. 
27
 Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal 
treatment in employment and occupation, OJ L 303, 2.12.2000, p 16. 
28
 See part C. 
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 Ibid, Art 6, discussed in part DIII. 
30
 See Collins, above n9, 21. 
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SURWHFWHG¶ +XPDQ GLJQLW\ LV DQ LQKHUHQW ULJKW IRU DOO human beings derived from the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The explanations state that µnone of the rights¶ 
in the Charter µmay be used to harm the dignity of another person, and that the dignity of 
WKH KXPDQ SHUVRQ LV SDUW RI WKH VXEVWDQFH RI WKH ULJKWV ODLG GRZQ LQ WKLV &KDUWHU¶ $V
Article 30 is expressed positively as a right and may conflict with other rights and 
freedoms in the Charter, such as Article 16 on the freedom to conduct a business, this 
wording is important. At the very least, Article 30, read together with Article 1, 
recognises that, even if the decision to dismiss a worker is a legitimate exercise of the 
managerial prerogative, it is necessary for the employer to act rationally by respecting 
DQG SURWHFWLQJ WKH ZRUNHU¶V right to be treated with dignity in the conduct of that 
dismissal.31 
 Article 3 brings into play the autonomy rationale suggested by Collins. It states 
WKDWµHYHU\RQHKDVDULJKWWRUHVSHFWIRUKLVRUKHUSK\VLFDODQGPHQWDOLQWHJULW\¶6XFFHVV
at work, or the ambition to succeed and be satisfied in the work environment, is integral 
to personal autonomy and physical and mental well-being. As Collins observes, dismissal 
from employment deprives the worker not only of their major source of income, but also 
leads to a loss of status. In some cases, the worker, deprived of µmembership of the most 
significant community in WKHLU OLIH¶ VXIIHUV D SHUVRQDO LPSDFW akin to a criminal 
punishment.32 Dismissal without cause strikes at the personal integrity of the individual 
that is the root of Article 3. 
 Article 10 on freedom of thought, conscience and religion, corresponding to 
Article 9 ECHR, is of direct relevance in cases where termination of employment is in 
violation of the freedom to hold religious or other beliefs.33 Article 10 also interacts with 
Article 21 on non-GLVFULPLQDWLRQRQWKHJURXQGRIµUHOLJion RUEHOLHI¶. 
 Article 12 on freedom of association, sourced from Article 11 ECHR, is also 
relevant. The essence of this freedom is the right of all workers, as autonomous human 
beings, to join and participate in trade unions that represent and protect their interests in 
the workplace. The autonomy of the worker to exercise the freedom to join a trade union, 
or not to join,34 is jeopardised if there is no protection against dismissal for this reason. 
Article 5 of ILO Convention No 158 on Termination of Employment identifies union 
membership or participation in union activities outside of working hours or, with the 
consent of the employer, within working hours, as not constituting valid reasons for 
termination.35 
 Article 15 on the freedom to choose an occupation and engage in work interacts 
closely with Article 30. Underlying Article 15, LVWKHQRWLRQRIDQDXWRQRPRXVµULJKWWR
ZRUN¶ DOWKRXJK QRW D ULJKW WR ZRUN LQ D SDUWLFXODU MRE 8QMXVWLILHG WHUPLQDWLRQ RI
HPSOR\PHQWQHJDWHVWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VULJKWWRZRUNand choice of occupation.36 It follows 
that laws on unjust dismissal should include a right to reinstatement or re-engagement in 
a comparable job as the most meaningful remedy to restore justice for the worker.  
 The relationship between Article 30 and Article 16, on freedom to conduct a 
business, is sensitive and ill-defined. Article 16 is sourced from the case law of the Court 
                                                          
31
 Ibid, 16-18. 
32
 Ibid, 2. 
33
 See ECtHR, Ivanova v Bulgaria [2007] no 52435/99. 
34
 Young, James and Webster v United Kingdom [1981] nos 7601/76 and 7806/77. 
35
 Art 5(a). 
36
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ILJ 65 at 76-78. 
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of Justice which has recognised the freedom to exercise an economic or commercial 
activity.37 It enshrines managerial authority as a corollary of economic freedom. Article 
30 acts as a counterweight to Article 16 by limiting managerial authority to dismiss at 
will. Article 16, in common with Article 30, operates in accordance with Union law and 
national law and practices. Member States, therefore, have freedom to reconcile any 
conflict between Articles 16 and 30 so long as their rules are compatible with EU law and 
international obligations. 
 Article 17 on the right to property interacts with Article 30 only to the extent that 
it is accepted that there is an element of property ownership in the job for the individual 
worker. The right of the worker to protection against unjust dismissal implies that 
ownership of the job is not in the exclusive control of the employer. Article 30 does not, 
however, establish DQ XQIHWWHUHG ULJKW RI WKH ZRUNHU WR µRZQ¶ RU µXVH¶ WKH MRE DV D
µODZIXOO\ DFTXLUHG SRVVHVVLRQ¶ LQ WKH VHQVH HQYLVDJHG E\ $UWLFOH   The concept of 
acquired property ownership rights is analogous to acquired employment rights in the 
context of the Transfers of Undertakings Directive, 2001/23.38  
 Article 21 on non-discrimination and Article 23 on equality between men and 
women provide specific reference points for the protection of workers whose 
employment relationship has been terminated by reason, respectively, of discrimination 
on one of the grounds referred to in Article 21, at least to the extent that these replicate 
the grounds in Article 19 TFEU, or in the specific violation of the principle of equal 
treatment between men and women. In practice Articles 21 and 23 are stronger than 
Article 30 because, unlike Article 30, these Charter rights flow directly from EU treaty 
provisions put into effect in the legal orders of the Member States by the transposition of 
directives and underpinned by the general principle of equality evolved by the Court of 
Justice.  
 Article 25 on the rights of the elderly intersects with Article 30. For many older 
workers the right to job security and to continue in work until a time of their own 
choosing, is LPSRUWDQW IRU WKHLU µGLJQLW\¶DQGµLQGHSHQGHQFH¶DVH[SUHVVHG LQ$UWLFOH
and recognised implicitly in Article 23 RESC. Once older workers cease working they 
PD\ORVHDQLQWHJUDOSDUWRIWKHLUµVRFLDODQGFXOWXUDOOLIH¶However, the Court of Justice 
has taken a somewhat converse view of the dignity of the older worker when upholding a 
national rule allowing for compulsory retirement at the age of 67 on the basis, in part, of 
accepting a rationale that such a rule µPDNHV LW SRVVLEOH WR DYRLG D VLWXDWLRQ in which 
employment contracts are terminated in situations which are humiliating for elderly 
workers¶.39   
 Article 26 on the integration of persons with disabilities is also highly relevant 
when evaluating Article 30. The opportunity to obtain work but also to maintain it with 
VHFXULW\LVYLWDOIRUWKHµVRFLDODQGRFFXSDWLRQDOLQWHJUDWLRQ¶RISHUVRQVZLWKGLVDELOLWLHV
Social inclusion through employment is at the core of the UN Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities, which obliges State parties to prohibit discrimination on the 
                                                          
37
 The explanation on Art 16 refers to the following cases, inter alia: Case 4/73 Nold [1974] ECR 491, para 
14; Case 230/78 Sp A Eridinia and others [1979] ECR 2749, paras 20-21; Case C-240/97 Spain v 
Commission [1999] ECR I-6571. 
38
 Council Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on the approximation of the law of the Member States 
relating to WKH VDIHJXDUGLQJRI HPSOR\HHV¶ ULJKWV LQ WKH HYHQWRI WUDQVIHUVRI XQGHUWDNLQJV EXVLQHVVHVRU
parts of undertakings or businesses, OJ L 82, 22.3.2001, p 16.  
39
 Case C-141/11 Hörnfeldt, 5 July 2012, para 34. 
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basis of disability with regard to µall matters concerning all forms of employmeQW¶
LQFOXGLQJ µcontinuance of employment¶40 The UN Convention has been approved by 
Council Decision 2010/4841 and, therefore, as the Court of Justice has recently observed 
in Ring and Werge,42 its provisions are, from the time of the entry into force of the 
Convention, an integral part of the EU legal order. It follows that the general non-
discrimination Directive, 2000/78, must, as far as possible, be interpreted in a manner 
consistent with the Convention.43 In that context, the Court of Justice proceeded to hold 
that Directive 2000/78 must be interpreted as precluding national legislation under which 
an employer can terminate the employment contract with reduced notice if a disabled 
worker has been absent because of illness, with his salary paid, for 120 days during the 
previous 12 months, where those absences are either WKHFRQVHTXHQFHRIWKHHPSOR\HU¶V
failure to take the appropriate measures in accordance with the obligation to provide 
reasonable accommodation,44 or, where those absences are the consequences of his 
disability, unless that legislation, as well as pursuing a legitimate aim, does not go 
beyond what is necessary to achieve that aim.45 
 Article 27 on the right of workers to information and consultation within the 
undertaking is concerned with the process of termination of employment and therefore 
interacts with Article 30 in the specific contexts of Directive 98/59 on collective 
redundancies and Directive 2001/23 on transfers of undertakings.46 More generally, 
Article 27 places emphasis on the importance of transparency and procedural fairness in 
the termination of employment even in circumstances where dismissal may be justified in 
substance.47 
 Article 28 on the right of collective bargaining and action interrelates with Article 
30 in two ways. First, the individual worker facing the prospect of dismissal can secure 
representation from their trade union who will advocate on their behalf. Collective 
bargaining backed up by the ultimate threat of industrial action is also vital in preventing 
or reducing mass redundancies or mitigating their impact. The effectiveness of the 
interaction between Articles 28 and 30 is blunted somewhat, however, by the exclusion 
of the right to strike from the legal basis provisions in Article 153 TFEU. Second, those 
participating in collective bargaining require protection from dismissal.48   
 Article 33(2) is the only other right or principle in the Charter providing express 
SURWHFWLRQIURPGLVPLVVDO ,WSURYLGHVWKDWµHYHU\RQH¶VKDOOKDYHWKHµULJKW WRSURWHFWLRQ
                                                          
40
 Art 27a: http://www.un.org/disabilities/convention/conventionfull.shtml (adopted 13 Dec 2006). 
41
 Council Decision 2010/48/EC of 26 November 2009, OJ L 23, 27.1.2010, p 35. 
42
 Cases C-335 and 337/11, 11 April 2013, para 30. 
43
 Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal 
treatment in employment and occupation, OJ L 303, 2.12.2000, p 16. The UN Convention entered into 
force on 3 May 2008. 
44
 Cases C-335 and 337/11 Ring and Werge, 11 April 2013, point 3 of the operative part of the judgment. 
The obligation to provide reasonable accommodation is laid down in Article 5 of Directive 2000/78, ibid.  
45
 Ibid, point 4 of the operative part of the judgment. 
46
 Council Directive 98/59/EC of 20 July 1998 on the approximation of laws of the Member States relating 
to collective redundancies, OJ L 225, 12.8.1998, p 16 (as corrected by Corrigendum, OJ L 59, 27.2.2007) 
and Council Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on the approximation of the law of the Member 
6WDWHVUHODWLQJWRWKHVDIHJXDUGLQJRIHPSOR\HHV¶ULJKWVLQWKHHYHQWRIWUDQVIHUVRIXQGHUWDNLQJVEXVLQHVVHV
or parts of undertakings or businesses, OJ L 82, 22.3.2001, p 16. 
47
 Collins, n9 above, at 104-140. See also, Arts 7-10 of ILO Convention No 158, n8 above. 
48
 See Art 5(b) of ILO Convention No 158. 
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IURPGLVPLVVDO¶ IRU UHDVRQVFRQQHFWHGZLWKPDWHUQLW\ WKH ULJKW WRSDLGPDWHUQLW\ OHDYH
and parental leave following the birth or adoption of a child. As it is sourced directly 
from EU legislation, discussed in part A above, it places those workers who fall within its 
scope with a firm foundation of employment protection without the need to draw directly 
on Article 30.  
 Article 34 recognises the entiWOHPHQW WR VRFLDO VHFXULW\ DQG VRFLDO DVVLVWDQFH µLQ
WKHFDVHRI ORVVRI HPSOR\PHQW¶ ,W LV D OLPLWHG SULQFLSOHPDLQO\ JRYHUQHGE\QDWLRQDO
law, but it provides some recognition of the important role of social security in 
cushioning the worker against the worst effects of termination of employment in 
circumstances where it may be unexpected or unjustified or both. 
 Article 41(2) on the right of every person to be heard, the right to have access to 
his or her file, and the obligation of the Union to give reasons for its decisions, is 
important for EU civil servants seeking to rely directly on their right to a fair procedure in 
the event of their dismissal. Article 42 on the right of access to documents is also 
important in this respect. The Court of Justice, in Strack,49 has recently upheld the right 
of EU civil servants to expect their institutional employer to observe both procedural and 
substantive employment rights in the Charter when applying the Staff Regulations in 
accordance with Article 51(1). 
 Finally, Article 47 on the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial is 
emerging as a significant dimension of the right to protection against unjustified 
dismissal. First, the worker who succeeds in establishing unjustified termination within 
the scope of EU law is entitled to an effective remedy including the possibility of 
reinstatement in the job or re-engagement or, if this is not practicable or possible, to be 
awarded adequate compensation. Second, Article 24 RESC provides that a right to appeal 
WRµDQLPSDUWLDOERG\¶LVDQHVVHQWLDOSDUWRIWKHSURWHFWLRQRIWKHFODLPRIDZRUNHUZKR
considers that their employment has been terminated without a µvalid reason¶.50 It follows 
that the right to be given a valid reason for dismissal is essential for the protection of civil 
rights and the entitlement of the worker seeking redress to a fair hearing by a tribunal 
guaranteed by Article 6 ECHR, which is a primary source of Article 47.51  
  




The ECHR is not a direct source of Article 30 but there are a number of connections 
between its provisions and the rights of workers on termination of employment. Article 6 
of the Convention has acquired particular significance. In a series of cases the European 
Court of Human Rights has gradually extended the applicability of the right to an 
effective remedy and a fair trial to labour disputes concerning civil servants.52 For the 
Strasbourg Court, judicial protection is not effective if there is a procedural or substantive 
                                                          
49
 Case C-579/12 RX-II European Commission v Strack (19 Sept 2013). 
50
 This is a reference to the distinction between valid and invalid reasons for dismissal contained in ILO 
Convention No 158 discussed in CIII. 
51
 See ECtHR, K.M.C. v Hungary, ECtHR [2012] no 19554/11. 
52
 Frydlender v France [2000] no 30979/96, Vilho Eskelinen and Others v Finland [2007] no 63235/00 and 
Iordanov and Others v Bulgaria [2009] no 23530/02. 
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obstacle to a genuine judicial examination of the PHULWV RI WKH SDUWLHV¶ FODLPV.53 This 
approach applies in assessing the fairness of proceedings concerning removal of civil 
servants from office or the excessive length of dismissal proceedings.54 Rights on 
termination of employment have also been recognised in cases involving Article 9 ECHR 
on freedom of religion,55 DQG ODWWHUO\ XSKROGLQJ WKH ULJKWV RI µZKLVWOHEORZHUV¶ WR
protection from dismissal without notice for exercising their freedom of expression under 
Article 10 ECHR.56 In cases involving discriminatory dismissal, Article 14 ECHR and 
Protocol 12, where connected to another provision of the ECHR, are also engaged. 
 In the recent case of K.M.C v Hungary,57 the European Court of Human Rights 
has held that the dismissal of a civil servant without giving reasons, permitted under 
Hungarian law at the time of the case, meant that the dismissal could not be practically 
and effectively challenged independently in a hearing before an impartial tribunal 
contrary to Article 6 ECHR.58 The same conclusion had already been reached by the 
Hungarian Constitutional Court,59 which annulled the offending domestic legislation on 
similar grounds after the application had been made to Strasbourg. Significantly, the 
European Court of Human Rights referred expressly to Article 30 of the Charter in its 
judgment and noted that it draws on Article 24 RESC.60  
 
II UN Treaties 
 
Article 6 of the UN International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR) UHFRJQLVHV WKH µULJKW WR ZRUN¶ LQFOXGLQJ µWKH ULJKW RI HYHU\RQH WR WKH
RSSRUWXQLW\WRJDLQKLVOLYLQJE\ZRUNZKLFKKHIUHHO\FKRRVHVRUDFFHSWV¶61 State parties 
are UHTXLUHG WR µWDNH DSSURSULDWH VWHSV WR VDIHJXDUG WKLV ULJKW¶ and to ensure its 
progressive realisation. In General Comment No 18 on the Right to Work,62 the UN 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (UNCESR) noted that the right to 
ZRUN LPSOLHV WKH µULJKW QRW WR EH XQIDLUO\ GHSULYHG RI HPSOR\PHQW¶63 The normative 
content of the right incorporates ILO Convention No 158, discussed below.64 The UN 
Committee regards the failure to protect workers against unfair dismissal as a violation of 




                                                          
53
 See the decision of the Hungarian Constitutional Court, no 8/2011, cited affirmatively by the ECtHR in 
K.M.C. v Hungary [2012] no 19554/11, para 16. 
54
 Hraldo v Croatia [2011] no 23272/07, Mishgjoni v Albania [2010] no 18381/05 and Golnja v Slovenia 
[2006] no 76378/01.   
55
 Ivanova v Bulgaria [2007] no 52435/99. 
56
 Heinisch v Germany [2010] no 28274/08. 
57
 K.M.C. v Hungary [2012] no 19554/11. 
58
 Ibid, paras 33-36. 
59
 Hungarian Constitutional Court, no 8/2011. 
60
 K.M.C. v Hungary [2012] no 19554/11, paras. 18-19. 
61
 Adopted on 16 Dec 1966: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CESCR.aspx. 
62
 E/C 12/GC/18, 6 Feb 2006: http://tb.ohchr.org/default.aspx?Symbol=E/C.12/GC/18. 
63
 Ibid, para 6. 
64
 Ibid, para 11. 
65
 Ibid, para 35. 
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Article 30 can ultimately be traced back to two ILO instruments on termination of 
employment at the initiative of the employer, Recommendation No 119, 1963 - now 
replaced by Recommendation No 166, 1982 - and Convention No 158, 1982.66  The 
original non-binding Recommendation provided the foundation of the principle that 
termination of the employment relationship by the employer should not take place 
without a valid reason and also the right of a worker to appeal against that termination to 
an independent body. It spurred legislation to protect job security in many EU Member 
States.67 However, it was the adoption of the Convention, as a stronger normative 
measure, that began the process of elevating protection against unjustified dismissal to 
the level of an international human right.68 The main provisions are briefly outlined 
below but will be analysed in more depth in part DIII.  
 Article 4 of the Convention provides that: 
 
The employment of a worker shall not be terminated unless there is a valid reason for such termination 
connected with the capacity or conduct of the worker or based on the operational requirements of the 
undertaking, establishment or service. 
 
The Convention identifies specific reasons for termination that are not valid, including: 
union membership or participation in union activities; seeking office or acting as a 
ZRUNHUV¶ UHSUHVHQWDWLYH ILOLQJ D FRPSODLQW RU WDNLQJ SURFHHGLQJV DJDLQVW DQ HPSOR\HU
race, colour, sex, marital status, family responsibilities, pregnancy, religion, political 
opinion, national extraction or social origin; absence from work during maternity leave; 
and temporary absence from work because of illness or injury.69 Age is regarded as an 
invalid reason in paragraph 5 of the replacement Recommendation but it is not referred to 
in the Convention. 
 The substantive right to protection is backed up by procedural rights of the worker 
to a defence prior to, or at the time of, termination and a right of appeal against 
termination to an independent body, which can declare the dismissal invalid and remedy 
the situation by reinstatement, adequate compensation or other relief.70 The issue of 
remedies is considered further in part DV. 
 Under Article 2 of the Convention ratifying States have flexibility to exclude 
three categories of workers from some of the provisions. The excluded categories are: 
a) workers engaged on contracts of employment for a specified period of time or a 
specified task; 
b) workers serving a period of probation or a qualifying period of employment, 
µGHWHUPLQHGLQDGYDQFHDQGRID UHDVRQDEOHGXUDWLRQ¶ 
c)  workers engaged on a casual basis for a short period. 
 The impact of these limitations is discussed in DIV below, in particular the length 
RI D µUHDVRQDEOH¶ TXDOLI\LQJ SHULRG EXW WKHUH LV QR GRXEW WKDW E\ H[FOXGLQJ WKHVH
categories of workers, who are among the most vulnerable, the right is significantly 
impaired for many.  
                                                          
66
 ILO instruments can be found on the NORMLEX database: http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en. 
67
 (<HPLQµ-RE6HFXULW\LQIOXHQFHRI,/2VWDQGDUGVDQGUHFHQWWUHQGV¶International Law 
Review 17. 
68
 SHH%1DSLHUµ'LVPLVVDO± 7KH1HZ,/26WDQGDUGV¶Industrial Law Journal 17. 
69
 Arts 5-6. 
70




IV Council of Europe Treaties 
 
Article 1 ESC contains certain obligations on the contracting parties aimed at ensuring 
WKH µHIIHFWLYH H[HUFLVH RI WKH ULJKW WR ZRUN¶ EXW WKHse obligations have not been 
interpreted by the European Committee of Social Rights (ECSR) as including protection 
for workers against unjust dismissal except in instances of discrimination.71 
 The main source of Article 30 is Article 24 RESC on the right to protection in 
cases of termination of employment at the initiative of the employer. This provision is 
based on ILO Convention No 158 and is intended to bring the Council of Europe regime 
in line with the ILO to avoid double standards. Article 24 RESC is worded as follows:  
 
With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right of workers to protection in cases of termination 
of employment, the Parties undertake to recognise: 
a. the right of all workers not to have their employment terminated without valid reasons for such 
termination connected with their capacity or conduct or based on the operational requirements of the 
undertaking, establishment or service;  
b. the right of workers whose employment is terminated without a valid reason to adequate compensation 
or other appropriate relief. 
To this end the Parties undertake to ensure that a worker who considers that his employment has been 
terminated without a valid reason shall have the right to appeal to an impartial body. 
 
The Appendix to the RESC contains the same list of invalid reasons for termination of 
employment as Article 5 of the ILO Convention and also the same exceptions including 
the option for the contracting parties to introduce or maintain a qualifying period for a 
µUHDVRQDEOHGXUDWLRQ¶ before the right to bring a claim can be exercised.  
 In its case law, the ECSR has interpreted the core right in Article 24 RESC 
broadly and the exceptions strictly. As the content of Article 30 is based primarily on the 
right contained in Article 24 RESC the relevant case law will be discussed in the analysis 
in part D below. 
 
V National constitutional laws 
 
Article 30 is not sourced directly from national constitutional laws. Many provisions 
common to national constitutions, such as dignity, equality, non-discrimination and the 
right to a fair trial and an effective remedy, are relevant, but will not be discussed in 
detail in this chapter. It is important to note, however, that legislation on unjust dismissal 
in some Member States, and related laws, have been interpreted by national constitutional 
courts purposively to guarantee effective protection. For example, legislation in Germany 
and Scandinavia has been interpreted and applied by the courts to protect employee 
representatives from dismissal by guaranteeing fair procedures.72 
                                                          
71
 Digest of the Case Law of the European Committee on Social Rights, 1 Sept 2008, pp 19-25: 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/socialcharter/digest/DigestSept2008_en.pdf 
72
 6HH6$QGHUPDQµ7HUPLQDWLRQRI(PSOR\PHQW:KRVH3URSHUW\5LJKWV"¶LQ&%DUQDUG6'Hakin and G 
S Morris (eds), The Future of Labour Law (Oxford, Hart, 2004) 101-DWDQG%+HSSOHµ(XURSHDQ
5XOHVRQ'LVPLVVDOV/DZ"¶Comp Labour Law J 204 at 210-12. 
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 Article 18 of the Italian Statuto di Lavoratori73 is of particular interest. It has been 
associated with the concept of strong stability in the employment relationship to limit the 
power of dismissal. This concept has been constructed in the post-1945 period and 
recognised by the Constitutional Court when interpreting the Statuto.74 In its original 
version, the Statuto provided that if a worker claimed unfair dismissal, there was a right 
to interim relief until the tribunal decided the case. Enterprises or organisations 
employing more than 15 persons were required to reinstate the unjustly dismissed worker 
in the job and penalties could be imposed for failure to comply.75 Wedderburn described 
the Statuto as a version RI µKDEHDV FRUSXV IRU WKH ZRUNHU¶76 Anderman regarded it as 
forcefully imposing responsibility on the employer not to dismiss without an independent 
assessment rather than necessarily creating a property right in the job.77 Until recently, 
attempts to modify the legislation had met with strong, sometimes violent, opposition. 
Significantly, however, a reform law was adopted in 2012, which makes certain 
procedural changes but, most importantly, ends obligatory reinstatement as the only 
remedy for unjustified dismissal in most cases involving employers with more than 15 
workers E\ SURYLGLQJ IRU FRPSHQVDWLRQ LQ WKH UDQJH RI RQH WR WZR \HDUV¶ SD\ DV DQ
alternative.78 Whilst such a revision has almost certainly only been possible because of 
the economic crisis, the revised Article 18 remains among the most protective provisions 
on job security in the laws of the Member States. 
 
D.  Analysis 
 
I General Remarks 
 
Article 30 carries with it connotations of a property right in the job for the worker, or at 
least a shift in that direction. Whilst there is much to support this analysis, it is more 
accurate to understand the right as a mechanism for adjusting the employer-worker power 
relationship. Protection against unjustified dismissal places limits on the exercise of 
ownership rights by the employer but it does not create property rights for the worker in a 
particular job.79 The main challenge for legislators and judges, when evaluating Article 
 LV WR ILQG WKHULJKWEDODQFHEHWZHHQ WKHHPSOR\HU¶VPDQDJerial prerogative to make 
EXVLQHVVGHFLVLRQVDQGWKHZRUNHU¶VUHDVRQable expectation of job security. The balance 
of interests was summarised by the ILO¶V Committee of Experts on the Application of 
Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR) in its 1974 General Survey on 
Recommendation No 119:80 
 
                                                          
73
 Law no 300/1970. 
74
 6%HOORPRµ,WDOLDQ5HSRUW¶'UDIWSDSHUSUHVHQWHGDWWKe Seminar of Comparative Labour Law 
µ3RQWLJQDQR;;;¶0RGHQD-19 July 2013. See Case no 174, 12 December 1972. 
75
 Anderman, above n72 at 122-23. 
76
 /RUG:HGGHUEXUQµ7KH,WDOLDQ:RUNHUV6WDWXWH%ULWLVK5HIOHFWLRQVRQD+LJK3RLQWRI/HJDO3URWHFWLRQ¶
(1990) 19 ILJ 154. 
77
 Anderman, above n72 at 123. 
78
 Law no 92/2012. See Bellamo, above n74. I am very grateful to Stefano Bellomo and Massimiliano 
Delfino for their advice on the labour law reforms in Italy.  
79
 See Anderman, above n72. 
80
 ILO GS 1974 on the reports related to Recommendation No 119, para 3. 
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Although the Recommendation is HVVHQWLDOO\ LQWHQGHG WR SURYLGH SURWHFWLRQ RI WKH ZRUNHU¶V VHFXULW\ RI
employment, it also embodies an attempt to balance the several interests involved: that of the worker in job 
VHFXULW\VLQFHWKHORVVRIKLVMREPD\PHDQORVVRIKLVDQGKLVIDPLO\¶VOLvelihood; that of the employer in 
retaining authority over matters affecting the efficient operation of the undertaking, that of the community 
in maintaining peaceful labour relations and avoiding unnecessary dislocations due to either unemployment 
or unproductive economic units. 
 
 In seeking to find this balance the need for D µYDOLG UHDVRQ¶ IRU GLVPLVVDO LV
paramount.  As we have seen, the obligation on the employer to provide a valid reason 
for dismissal, and the listing of reasons that are automatically deemed not valid, is 
derived from Articles 4 and 5 of ILO Convention No 158 and reinforced by Article 24 
RESC. The CEACR regards the &RQYHQWLRQ¶VSURYLVLRQVDVHVWDEOLVKLQJDµIXQGDPHQWDO
SULQFLSOH RI MXVWLILFDWLRQ¶ IRU WHUPLQDWLQJ HPSOR\PHQW UHODWLRQVKLSs of indefinite 
duration81 and, more radically, it advises that the Convention removes the possibility for 
µXQLODWHUDO¶WHUPLQDWLRQE\PHDQVRIDSHULRGRIQRWLFHRUFRPSHQVDWLRQLQOLHX82 
 The judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in K.M.C. v Hungary83 is 
significant in highlighting WKH LQFLGHQWDO DSSOLFDWLRQ RI WKH µIXQGDPHQWDO SULQFLSOH RI
MXVWLILFDWLRQ¶ IRU GLVPLVVDO LQ the context of broader civil and political rights and 
freedoms guaranteed under the ECHR and having the same meaning and scope in the 
Charter. The right to a fair hearing in Article 6 ECHR requires a reason ± implicitly a 
valid reason ± for dismissal to be communicated to the worker in order for that right to be 
practical and effective.84 Rights to freedom of religion, freedom of expression, freedom 
of association and non-discrimination, in Articles 9, 10, 11 and 14 ECHR, among others, 
will be violated if there is interference with the exercise of these civil rights. Such 
interference will be present in cases where the exercise of the right in question carries 
with it the sanction of unilateral termination of employment. Similarly, it must follow 
from this reasoning, that the right to an effective remedy under Article 13 ECHR requires 
reinstatement or adequate compensation in lieu.  
 Also, it can be argued that by referring to both Article 30 and Article 24 RESC, 
and noting that the latter is the source of the former in the explanations,85 the European 
Court of Human Rights is sending a message that the effect of incorporating Article 30 
into the Charter, and granting the Charter the same legal value as the Treaties under 
Article 6(1) TEU, is to create an obligation on all EU Member States, as members of the 
Council of Europe, to guarantee the right to protection in cases of termination of 
employment regardless of whether or not those States have ratified the RESC.  
 Judge Pinto de Albuquerque is more explicit in a separate concurring opinion 
issued with the judgment. In his opinion, the effect of the adoption of Article 30 and the 
explanDWLRQV KDV EHHQ WR UHLQIRUFH D (XURSHDQ µFRQVHQVXV¶ RQ SURWHFWLRQ LQ FDVHV RI
WHUPLQDWLRQ RI HPSOR\PHQW DPRXQWLQJ WR D µSRVLWLYH REOLJDWLRQ IRU WKH &RQWUDFWLQJ
Parties to the Convention to implement the principle of justification for termination of 
employmHQW¶86 The Court had previously established that a social right can be 
OHJLWLPDWHO\GHULYHGIURPD&RQYHQWLRQSURYLVLRQµHYHQZKHQVXFKDULJKWLVIRUHVHHQLQ
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 CEACR Direct Request ± Luxembourg (2007). 
82
 CEACR General Survey ± Protection against unjustified dismissal (1995), para 76. 
83
 K.M.C. v Hungary [2012] no 19554/11. 
84
 Ibid, paras 33-35. 
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the [ESC] and the Contracting Party is not bound by the relevant provision of the 
>(6&@¶87 Referring also to Article 6 ICESCR and ILO Convention No 158, he concludes 
WKDW LW LV µQRW DFFHSWDEOH¶ IRU RQH 6WDWH WR DGYRFDWH D µGRXEOH VWDQGDUG¶ LQ UHVSHFW RI
termination of employment in respect of different international organisations.88 
 7KH-XGJH¶VRSLQLRQDPRXQWVWRDUREXVWDVVHUWLRQRI WKHµIXQGDPHQWDOSULQFLSOH
RI MXVWLILFDWLRQ¶LQ WKH(XURSHDQKXPDQULJKWVFRQWH[W It explains the basis upon which 
the European Court of Human Rights was able to make interconnections between Article 
30, Article 24 RESC and Article 6 ECHR, so as to require Hungary to provide civil 
servants with valid reasons for termination of their employment that were capable of 
independent legal challenge.  
 K.M.C. v Hungary demonstrates the potential of what Kahn-Freund once 
described DVWKHµUHIOH[HIIHFW¶RISURFODLPLQJIXQGDPHQWDOVRFLDOULJKWVDVLQWKHFDVHRI
Article 30, as a basis for µWKHinterpretation of positive legal norms and as direct sources 
of rights¶.89 However, reflexive interpretation requires the existence of a positive legal 
norm. The legal vacuum in the EU and the limitations of Article 30 in the legal orders of 
the Member States has been starkly demonstrated in Nagy,90 a follow-up case to K.M.C. v 
Hungary referred directly to the Court of Justice by a Hungarian court in October 2012, 
some three months after the European Court of Human Rights had given judgment.  
 Nagy concerned a group of Hungarian civil servants who had been removed from 
office without cause under the same law adjudicated in K.M.C. v Hungary, which 
SHUPLWWHGWHUPLQDWLRQRIHPSOR\PHQWLQWKHFLYLOVHUYLFHµZLWKRXWMXVWLILFDWLRQ¶7KHFLYLO
servants were dismissed prior to the annulment of the law by the Constitutional Court in 
May 2011. The Hungarian court referred the case to the Court of Justice on the basis that 
$UWLFOH  µKDV GLUHFW HIIHFW LQ WHUPV RI LWV DSSOLFDELOLW\¶ DQG LW ZDV WKHUHIRUH VHHNLQJ
guidance on the scope of the right, including the need to notify the worker of the reason 
for the dismissal and the existence of a remedy. Not surprisingly, the Court of Justice, in 
a brief Order, ruled that it did not have jurisdiction. The national court was incorrect in 
assuming that Article 30 had direct effect and had misunderstood Article 51. The Court 
of Justice noted that the orders for reference did not contain any evidence that the 
SURFHHGLQJV µFRQFHUQ WKH LQWHUSUHWDWLRQRUDSSOLFDWLRQRID UXOHRI WKH8QLRQRWKHU WKDQ
WKRVHFRQWDLQHGLQWKH&KDUWHU¶DQGGLGQRWFRQFHUQWKHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRI(8ODZZLWKLQ
the meaning of Article 51. The invocation of provisions of the Charter could not, alone, 
establish competence on the Court of Justice to answer questions from the national 
court.91  
 The finding of the Court of Justice is axiomatic but it lays bare just how limited 
the Court of Justice is as a human rights court in the absence of a direct connection 
between EU law and a Charter right. It is therefore important to consider relevant case 
law of the Court of Justice in two examples where EU law has the potential to offer a 
degree of protection to individual workers in the event of termination of their 
employment contract or relationship and Article 30 has the potential to be useful. 
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 The first example, the Transfers of Undertakings Directive, 2001/23,92 outlined in 
part A, is largely bereft of the language of rights, but it does recognise, implicitly, 
important elements of the evolving right of protection in circumstances where dismissal 
can be deemed unfair or unjust. It upholds the right of an employee to job security in 
situations where an employer might otherwise be free to carry out dismissals at will in 
order to sell or sub-contract the business subject only to following certain procedural 
obligations laid down under national laws or practices.93 More radically, by restricting the 
possibilities for dismissal, it allows for certain rights, such as pay and conditions that 
have been acquired over time by the employee, including by means of collective 
agreements, to be transferred with the employee to the new employer. The notion that 
such rights have been acquired and should not be forfeited, even in the event of 
termination of the original contract, is capable of being interpreted as a conceptualisation 
of the right to protection against unjust dismissal that transcends job security and 
recognises, in this particular context, the job itself as a property right, or stake, owned by 
the employee.  
 The Court of Justice has not been asked to rule in a case on Directive 2001/23 
concerning a potential violation of Article 30. However, in Alemo-Herron,94 it gave 
SUHFHGHQFHWRDQHPSOR\HU¶VIUHHGRPWRFRQGXFWDEXVLQHVVunder Article 16 in a fashion 
that weakens the protection of acquired rights. The case concerned the contracting out of 
leisure services by an English local authority to a private company which, two years later, 
sold its business to another company, Parkwood. Pay was determined by a national 
collective agreement renewed periodically. The question arose as to whether Parkwood 
were bound by the national collective agreement as they had not been a party to the 
negotiations. Advocate General Cruz Villalón supported a dynamic interpretation 
suggested by the UK Supreme Court under which the transferee is bound under the 
English law of contract not only by collective agreements in force at the time but also 
subsequent to that transfer. The Advocate General noted that the freedom to conduct a 
EXVLQHVVLQ$UWLFOHLVQRWDQDEVROXWHULJKWDQGLVµYHU\PXFKRSHQWREHLQJXVHGDVD
FRXQWHUZHLJKW¶ WRRWKHU IXQGDPHQWDO ULJKWV95 The logic would suggest that, at the very 
least, a balance should be struck between Article 16 and fundamental social rights in the 
Charter. By contrast, the Court of Justice, relying heavily on the principle of contractual 
freedom in Article 16, preferred a static interpretation of acquired rights on the basis that 
requiring the transferee to be bound by a contractual process to which he is not a party 
VHULRXVO\UHGXFHVWKHHPSOR\HU¶V FRQWUDFWXDOIUHHGRPµWRWKHSRLQWWKDWVXFKDOLPLWDWLRQ
is liable to adversely affect the very essence oILWVIUHHGRPWRFRQGXFWDEXVLQHVV¶96 
 7KH&RXUWRI-XVWLFH¶V MXGJPHQW LVXQGHUVWDQGDEOH LI$UWLFOH LVFRQVLGHUHG LQ
isolation. As the employees in question had not had their contracts terminated the 
application of Article 30 did not arise directly. However, taking into account the 
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objectives of the Directive, it should have been considered as a µcounterweight¶ to Article 
16. The employees had only been able to keep their jobs because the Directive is 
GHVLJQHGWRJXDUDQWHHµWKHSURWHFWLRQRIHPSOR\HHVLn the event of a change of employer, 
LQ SDUWLFXODU WR HQVXUH WKDW WKHLU ULJKWV DUH VDIHJXDUGHG¶97 At the very least, the Court 
should have taken account of the balance between the commercial interests of the 
company inheriting the transferred employees and the protection afforded to those 
employees to retain their acquired rights under established collective bargaining 
processes. Flexible methods of contractual interpretation, which are the norm under UK 
law, would have allowed for a dynamic approach without fundamentally restricting 
economic freedom. 
 The second example, the Collective Redundancies Directive, 98/59,98 previously 
referred to in part A, is relevant to Article 30 because it relates to termination of 
HPSOR\PHQWEDVHGRQWKHµRSHUDWLRQDOUHTXLUHPHQWV¶RIWhe undertaking, establishment or 
service falling within Article 4 of ILO Convention No 158 and Article 24 RESC. Whilst a 
dismissal for economic reasons would not normally involve disrespect or indignity for the 
worker, Article 30 is potentially engaged because it is essential, in the interests of justice 
in dismissal, for a fair procedure to be followed and objective criteria applied in the 
selection of workers to be made redundant.99  
 One immediate issue is the relationship between individual and collective 
dismissals. Under Article 1(a) of the DirectiveWKHWHUPµFROOHFWLYHUHGXQGDQFLHV¶PHDQV
µGLVPLVVDOVHIIHFWHGE\WKHHPSOR\HUIRURQHRUPRUHUHDVRQVnot related to the individual 
workers¶100 Article 6 places a duty on Member States to ensure that judicial and/or 
DGPLQLVWUDWLYH SURFHGXUHV IRU WKH HQIRUFHPHQW RI µREOLJDWLRQV¶ XQGHU WKH 'LUHFWLYH DUH
DYDLODEOHWRWKHZRUNHUV¶UHSUHVHQWDWLYHVDQGRUZRUNHUV 
 The possible application of Article 30 in this context has arisen in two cases 
before the Court of Justice.101 In the first case, Mono Car Styling,102 Advocate General 
Mengozzi, in the only substantive evaluation of Article 30 to date in proceedings before 
the Court of Justice, briefly considered its potential relevance in the context of the 
CollHFWLYH 5HGXQGDQFLHV 'LUHFWLYH ,Q KLV RSLQLRQ WKH XQGHUO\LQJ SXUSRVH RI WKH (8¶V
OHJLVODWXUH E\ HVFKHZLQJ WKH ODQJXDJH RI µULJKWV¶ DQG SUHIHUULQJ WR UHIHU LQVWHDG WR
µREOLJDWLRQV¶ LV µQRW WR EHVWRZ D VHULHV RI ULJKWV RQ WKRVH DIIHFWHG E\ FROOHFWLYH
redundancies, but to impose a series of obligations on employers who decide to make 
VXFKUHGXQGDQFLHV¶103 It follows, according to the Advocate General, that Article 30 does 
not require an individual right of action to be provided in any case in the event of an 
employer failing to observe the information and consultation procedure.104 In his 
DVVHVVPHQWWKHUHIHUHQFHWRSURWHFWLRQDJDLQVWµXQMXVWLILHG¶GLVPLVVDOLQ$UWLFOHLVDQ
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LPSRUWDQW µTXDOLILFDWLRQ¶ZKLFKµPDNHVFOHDU¶ WKDW WKHSURWHFWLRQRIHYHU\ZRUNHU Ls not 
SURYLGHG µDV D IXQGDPHQWDO LQGLYLGXDO ULJKW ZLWK UHVSHFW WR HYHU\ NLQG RI LUUHJXODULW\
WKDWDGLVPLVVDOPLJKW LQYROYH¶105 Instead, to invoke Article 30 within the scope of EU 
ODZWKHUHPXVWEHDµVHULRXVLUUHJXODULW\¶DVPLJKWDULVHIRUH[DPSOH Ln relation to the 
actual merits of the decision to dismiss. The Advocate General concluded that:106 
 
Breaches of Directive 98/59, on the other hand, do not appear such as to justify reference to Article 30 of 
the Charter for, given the content of the directive, it is intended that the result of such breaches will be 
illegality of a formal/procedural kind. 
 
$GYRFDWH *HQHUDO 0HQJR]]L¶V QDUURZ LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI $UWLFOH  ZRXOG HIIHFWLYHO\
exclude formal or procedural irregularities in the information and consultation process 
from the scope of unjust dismissal, an approach that is out of line with Articles 13-14 of 
ILO Convention No 158. In an observation on Convention the CEACR has commented 
that:107 
 
Terminations of employment for economic, technological, structural or similar reasons must be consistent 
with the provisions of Article 13 and 14 of the Convention, particularly in respect of the consultation of 
ZRUNHU¶VUHSUHVHQWDWLYHVDQGQRWLILFDWLRQWRWKHFRPSHWHQWDXWKRULW\ 
 
In the second case, Mayor,108 a group of employees had their contracts of employment 
terminated as a result of the death of their employer. The effect of Spanish law was to 
place the employees of a natural person in a weaker position than the employees of a 
company as the former were regarded as not being dismissed in the event of the death of 
the employer. The national court asked if the Spanish legislation infringed Article 30. 
The case appeared to provide an ideal opportunity to interpret Article 30 in the context of 
the implementation of EU law within the field of application of the Charter under Article 
51. However, the Court of Justice ruled that the dismissals could not be classified as a 
µcollective redundancy¶ because the provisions of Directive 98/59 presupposed the 
existence of an employer who contemplated redundancies and was capable of carrying 
out the required information and consultation process to put into effect such 
redundancies.109 It followed that the dispute was outside of the scope of the Directive and 
LWZDVµQRWQHFHVVDU\¶ to answer the question about the application of Article 30.110  
 7KH&RXUWRI-XVWLFH¶VUHDVRQLQJLQMayor is highly questionable. Post-Lisbon the 
Court should have considered whether a literal interpretation of the wording of the 
Directive was compatible with the Charter as Treaty-equivalent law rather than treating 
Article 30 as an afterthought.111 The difference of treatment under Spanish legislation 
between workers who have their contracts terminated due to the death of their employer 
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and workers who face dismissal due to corporate restructuring or insolvency is stark but 
deemed to be outside the scope of EU law. 
 
II Scope of Application 
 
Under Article 30 tKH ULJKW WR SURWHFWLRQ DJDLQVW XQMXVWLILHG GLVPLVVDO DSSOLHV WR µHYHU\
ZRUNHU¶ZLWKRXWTXDOLILFDWLRQ8VHRIWKHEURDGHUWHUPµZRUNHU¶UDWKHUWKDQµHPSOR\HH¶LV
indicative of an inclusive approach to fundamental social rights in the EU that appears to 
encompass not only employees with a regular contract of employment but also non-
standard workers including casual workers, µ]HUR KRXUV¶ ZRUNHUV KRPH ZRUNHUs, 
temporary agency workers and others who are not self-employed but may not have a 
contract of employment recognised under national law.112 Non-standard workers are in 
the most precarious position and are vulnerable to arbitrary dismissal.  
 Appearances are deceptive. Article 30 applies only µLQDFFRUGDQFHZLWK8QLRQODZ
DQGQDWLRQDOODZDQGSUDFWLFHV¶,QWKHFRXUVHRIWKLVFKDSWHUWKHWHUPµZRUNHU¶KDVEHHQ
XVHG LQ SUHIHUHQFH WR µHPSOR\HH¶ FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK $rticle 30 and an inclusive 
interpretation of ILO Convention No 158 and Article 24 RESC. However, although the 
,/2 &RQYHQWLRQ µDSSOLHV WR DOO EUDQFKHV RI HFRQRPLF DFWLYLW\ DQG DOO HPSOR\HG
SHUVRQV¶113 both it, and the appendix to the RESC, permit States to exFOXGH µZRUNHUV
HQJDJHGRQDFDVXDOEDVLVIRUDVKRUWSHULRG¶114 
 Where the term µHPSOR\HH¶KDVEHHQXVHGin this chapter it has referred to EU or 
national legislation that is limited to employees as defined under national law. The 
Transfers of Undertakings Directive is a good example. Article 2(1)(d) of the Directive 
restricts its scope to µDQ\SHUVRQZKRin the Member State concerned, is protected as an 
HPSOR\HHXQGHUQDWLRQDOODZ¶ (emphasis added). :KLVWWKHWHUPµZRUNHU¶LVXVHGLQ(8
health and safety legislation and some labour law directives, the personal scope of EU 
labour law is subject to a strong form of vertical subsidiarity which leads to a lack of 
legal coherence and contrasts with the development by the Court of Justice of a 
horizontal applicatLRQRI WKH FRQFHSWRI D µZRUNHU¶ IRU WKHSXUSRVHVRI HVWDEOLVKLQJ WKH
personal scope of core free movement provisions and gender equality law.115 In the 
absence of harmonisation RIWKHFRQFHSWVRIµHPSOR\HH¶DQGµZRUNHU¶DW(8OHYHO116 - or 
their replacement with an all-embracing µSHUVRQDO HPSOR\PHQW FRQWUDFW¶117 - protection 
against unjustified dismissal will be reserved mainly to the standard employee and the 
two-tier labour market will persist.   
 With regard to the scope of application more generally, the Charter requires 
consistent interpretation of the ECHR under Article 52(3), which is important bearing in 
mind the interconnections between ECHR rights and protection against termination 
identified by the European Court of Human Rights. It contains no information, however, 
on how to interpret the ESC, the RESC or ILO instruments. The ECSR has provided 
extensive guidance on the scope of the RESC. It is reasonable to expect that this guidance 
will, at least, be persuasive bearing in mind the direct reference to Article 24 RESC in the 
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explanations.118 The fact that this linkage was emphasised by the European Court of 
Human Rights in K.M.C. v Hungary,119 discussed in DI above, is important. It should 
point to a consistent interpretation of Article 24 RESC and Article 30 on the basis that all 
Member States are committed to upholding the Charter regardless of whether or not they 
have ratified the RESC. It is an approach that is necessary to ensure coherence in 
European human rights law and avoid a µGRXEOHVWDQGDrd¶120  
 
III Specific Provisions 
 
Judge Pinto de Albuquerque, in his separate opinion in K.M.C. v Hungary, offers a 
VXPPDU\ RI WKH µPLQLPXP FRQWHQW LQ (XURSHDQ KXPDQ ULJKWV ODZ¶ RI WKH ULJKW WR
protection in the event of termination of employment that provides a useful template for 
its application in the context of EU law and the laws of the Member States. The right to 
SURWHFWLRQFRQVLVWVRIIRXUµFRUHUHTXLUHPHQWV¶DFFRUGLQJWRWKH-XGJH121 
 
[1] a formal written notice of termination of employment given to the employee, 
[2] a pre-termination opportunity to respond given to the employee, 
[3] a valid reason for termination, and 
[4] an appeal to an independent body [with] powers to verify the factual and legal aspects of the 
 appealed decision and to remedy it, if it is found illegal.  
 
Termination of employment under ILO Convention No 158 and Article 24 RESC means 
termination at the initiative of the employer.122 This effectively excludes terminations by 
mutual consent and terminations on the initiative of the worker by reason of the 
HPSOR\HU¶VFRQGXFWRUZKDWLVNQRZQDVµFRQVWUXFWLYHGLVPLVVDO¶XQGHU8.ODZ123 
 Starting first with the requirement for notice for dismissal, there has been some 
useful guidance from the CEACR. According to the CEACR, the purpose of the formal 
written notice is to enable the worker to prepare himself to adapt to the situation and look 
for a new job.124 Article 11 of the Convention provides that such a period of notice must 
EHRIDµUHDVRQDEOH¶GXUDWLRQ7KHVSHFLILFOHQJWKRIQRWLFHLVOHIWWRQDWLonal legislation. 
Compensation in lieu is possible but it must correspond to the remuneration the worker 
would have received during the period of notice.125 The only exception to the obligation 
to give notice is the case of serious misconduct by the worker.126 
 Next, procedural fairness prior to termination is founded on the right to a defence 
contained in Article 7 of the Convention. This is essential to allow workers to be heard by 
the employer and to ensure that any decision to terminate is preceded by dialogue and 
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reflection between the parties.127 The Recommendation envisages the issuance of a 
ZDUQLQJSULRUWRWHUPLQDWLRQDQGLVPRUHVSHFLILFLQUHTXLULQJFRQVXOWDWLRQZLWKZRUNHUV¶
representatives before a final decision is taken and making provision for the worker to be 
represented when defending himself.128 
 TKHUHTXLUHPHQWIRUDµYDOLGUHDVRQ¶or justification for termination is regarded as 
a fundamental principle and WKH µFRUQHUVWRQH¶129 of the substantive right in Article 4 of 
the Convention and Article 24 RE6&7KHILUVWYDOLGUHDVRQLGHQWLILHGLVµFDSDFLW\¶RIWKH
worker either due to a lack of skills or qualities necessary to perform certain tasks or poor 
work performance not caused by intentional misconduct.  
 In making decisions on the basis of the capacity of the worker, employers must 
ensure that they do not violate the principle of non-discrimination in Article 23 of the 
Charter and Directive 2000/78. The Court of Justice, in its judgment in Ring and 
Werge,130 has taken a very broad view of the concept of µGLVDELOLW\¶FRQVLVWHQWZLWKWKH
UN Convention, discussed in part B above,131 and therefore protection in this respect is 
stronger than under the ILO Convention and the RESC.132  
 More problematic is age discrimination where a decision to terminate on grounds 
RIDJHFDQEHMXVWLILHGXQGHU$UWLFOHRI'LUHFWLYHLIµREMHFWLYHO\DQGUHDVRQDEO\
justified by a legitimate aim, including legitimate employment policy, labour market and 
vocational training objectives, and if the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and 
QHFHVVDU\¶  
 In a series of cases, the Court of Justice has upheld mandatory retirement ages 
permitted under national legislation on the basis of employment policies aimed at sharing 
employment opportunities among the generations,133 and, in a recent case, backing this 
up with a reference to the right to work in Article 15 of the Charter.134 In Prigge,135 a 
mandatory requirement for airline pilots to retire at the age of 60 was struck down as 
disproportionate because it took no account of the capability of the individuals concerned 
and the reasons given, including the safety of passengers, were not sufficiently connected to 
the labour market.  
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 Article 30 was not considered by the Court of Justice in these cases. Guidance 
from the CESR suggests that Contracting Parties to the RESC have a wide discretion to 
LPSRVH D µYDOLG UHWLUHPHQW DJH¶ MXVWLILHG E\ WKH RSHUDWLRQDO UHTXLUHPHQWV RI WKH
undertaking, establishment or service. Age is not listed as an invalid reason for dismissal 
in Article 5 of the ILO Convention or the RESC. It is referred to in paragraph 5(a) of the 
ILO Recommendation but with WKHFDYHDWWKDWLWLVµVXEMHFWWRQDWLRQDOODZDQGSUDFWLFH
UHJDUGLQJUHWLUHPHQW¶ 
 The next valid reason in Article 4 of the ILO Convention and Article 24 RESC is 
µFRQGXFW¶7ZRFDWHJRULHVRIPLVFRQGXFWKDYHEHHQLGHQWLILHGE\WKH&($&5136  
(a) inadequate performance of contractual duties, such as neglect, violation of work 
rules, disobedience of legitimate orders etc, or 
(b) improper behaviour, such as disorderly conduct, violence, assault, using insulting 
language, disrupting the peace of the workplace etc. 
 Misconduct outside of the workplace would not normally be a valid reason for 
dismissal. The ESRC has found that a prison sentence delivered in court for employment-
related offences can be a valid reason for dismissal but not if the offence is not 
employment-related unless the length of the custodial sentence prevents the person 
carrying out their work.137 
 The final valid reason for termination is one connected with the operational 
requirements of the undertaking, establishment or service. In these cases the dismissal 
must be for economic reasons not connected with capacity or conduct. Classically this 
will be a redundancy involving either a reduction of the workforce or closure of the 
undertaking.138 The CESR has not specified whether economic reasons must be limited to 
situations where employers are in difficulty or whether they can include other business 
strategies.139 
 Participation in trade union activities is listed among the reasons not constituting 
valid reasons for termination in Article 5 of the ILO Convention and the appendix to 
Article 24 RESC. Based on the case law of the European Court of Human Rights this 
must also include participation in strikes as it is ultimately derived from freedom of 
association as guaranteed by Article 11 ECHR.140 More precise provisions are found in 
Articles 5 and 6(4) ESC. Potentially, Article 30 can also be invoked. Under Article 7 of 
Directive 2002/14 on information and consultation of workers at national level,141 
0HPEHU 6WDWHV PXVW HQVXUH WKDW HPSOR\HHV¶ UHSUHVHQWDWLYHV ZKHQ FDUU\LQJ RXW WKHLU
functions, µenjoy adequate protection and guarantees to enable them to perform properly 
WKHGXWLHVZKLFKKDYHEHHQDVVLJQHGWRWKHP¶ In Holst,142 the Court of Justice ruled that 
GLVPLVVDO RQ JURXQGV RI VWDWXV RU FDUU\LQJ RXW WKH IXQFWLRQV RI DQ HPSOR\HHV¶
UHSUHVHQWDWLYH µFRXOGEH UHJDUGHGDVFRQVWLWXWLQJXQIDLUGLVPLVVDOXQGHU>QDWLRQDO@ ODZ¶ 
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Similar arguments can be mounted for contending that dismissal of strikers facing 
collective redundancy, without carrying out the information and consultation 
requirements in the Collective Redundancies Directive, 98/59, would amount to 
GLVPLVVDOV IRU µUHDVRQVQRW UHODWHG WR WKH LQGLYLGXDOZRUNHUVFRQFHUQHG¶ FRQWUDU\ WR WKH
Directive.143 
 ,Q FDVHV LQYROYLQJ µWHPSRUDU\ DEVHQFH IURP ZRUN EHFDXVH RI LOOQHVV RU LQMXU\¶, 
which is not a valid reason for termination,144 a time limit can be placed on protection 
against dismissal according to the CESR.145 Absence can constitute a valid reason for 
dismissal if it severely disrupts the smooth running of the undertaking and requires a 
permanent replacement for the absent worker. Additional protection must be offered, 
where necessary, for victims of employment injuries or occupational diseases.146 
 The right of a worker who considers that his employment has been terminated 
without a valid reason to appeal to an impartial body is contained in the final paragraph 
of Article 24 RESC and Articles 8-9 of the ILO Convention. Article 8(3) of the 
Convention allows for a time-limit on claims. The burden of proof is not placed expressly 
on the employer but the worker does not have to bear it alone.147 The Recommendation is 
stronger on the possibility of conciliation procedures before or during an appeal.148 If 
employment is terminated for economic reasons the appeal body must be empowered to 
investigate the economic facts underlying the measures according to the CESR.149   
 Additional provisions in the ILO Convention concern the entitlement of the 
worker to a severance allowance and other income protection150 and for consultation of 
ZRUNHUV¶UHSUHVHQWDWLYHV in the case of collective dismissals.151 Whilst the latter is similar 
in content to Directive 98/59, the interpretation of the CEACR, discussed in DI above, 
indicates the need for protection against dismissal in cases where there are breaches of 
the information and consultation procedures. 
 
IV Limitations and Derogations 
 
µ(YHU\ZRUNHU¶LVZLWKLQWKHSHUVRQDOVFRSHRIDSSOLFDWLRQRI$UWLFOHbut the right to 
SURWHFWLRQ DJDLQVW XQMXVWLILHG GLVPLVVDO RSHUDWHV µLQ DFFRUGDQFH ZLWK 8QLRQ ODZ DQG
QDWLRQDOODZVDQGSUDFWLFHV¶This limits the scope of application not only in EU law, as 
discussed in part A, but also, the international instruments allow for a significant degree 
of vertical subsidiarity and flexibility. As noted in CIII and IV above, the ILO 
Convention and Recommendation, and also the appendix to the RESC, permit States to 
exclude some of the most precarious workers from protection. 
 Let us consider the scope of these limitations and derogations by reference to the 
ILO Convention. The first excluded group are µZRUNHUV HQJDJHG XQGHU D FRQWUDFW RI
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HPSOR\PHQWIRUDVSHFLILHGSHULRGRI WLPHRUDVSHFLILHGWDVN¶152 There is a caveat that 
µDGHTXDWHVDIHJXDUGV¶PXVWEHSURYLGHGµDJDLQVWUHFRXUVHWRFRQWUDFWVRIHPSOR\PHQWIRU
a specified period of time the aim of which is to avoid the protection resulting from this 
&RQYHQWLRQ¶153 Bearing in mind the tripartite nature of the ILO, it is hardly surprising 
that the social partners negotiated a clause in the Framework Agreement annexed to the 
EU Fixed-term Work Directive, 1999/70, which requires Member States to introduce 
PHDVXUHV WR µSUHYHQW DEXVH¶ RI VXFFHVVLYH IL[HG-term employment contracts or 
relationships.154 This may have some limiting effect on the exclusion and it should be 
noted that fixed-WHUP µHPSOR\HHV¶ DUHSURWHFWHG DJDLQVWGLVPLVVDO LQ VRPH OHJDO RUGHUV
such as the UK.155 Also, the Cour de Cassation in France has relied directly on the 
safeguarding clause in the ILO Convention when striking down a national law on 
successive fixed-term contracts that had permitted termination without justification.156  
 The second excluded group are µZRUNHUV VHUYLQJ D SHULRG RI SUREDWLRQ RU D
qualifying period of HPSOR\PHQWGHWHUPLQHGLQDGYDQFHDQGRIUHDVRQDEOHGXUDWLRQ¶157 
7KLV OHDYHV RSHQ WKH TXHVWLRQ RI KRZ ORQJ LV D µUHDVRQDEOH GXUDWLRQ¶ IRU D TXDOLI\LQJ
period. There is important guidance on this point from the CESR and the ILO. The CESR 
has found that the exclusion of employees from protection against dismissal for six 
PRQWKV µLV QRW FRQVLGHUHG UHDVRQDEOH LI LW LV DSSOLHG LQGLVFULPLQDWHO\ UHJDUGOHVV RI WKH
HPSOR\HH¶V TXDOLILFDWLRQV¶158 An interesting test case has been decided by the ILO. In 
response to a French law introducing a two year qualifying period relating to individual 
and collective dismissals for undertakings with no more than 20 employees, the 
Confederation Générale du Travail alleged non-observance by France of the Convention 
and, in response, the ILO established a Tripartite Committee to investigate. In 2008 the 
Tripartite Committee concluded that a period as long as two years was not reasonable for 
excluding all of the employees concerned.159 The French Cour de Cassation subsequently 
found that the legislation did not fall into one of the categories that can be excluded from 
the Convention.160 
 This guidance is of interest in the light of recent developments in the UK. In 2012 
the UK introduced delegated legislation to vary the qualifying period for unfair dismissal 
from one year to two years for all claims.161 The Trades Union Congress estimated that 
2.7 million employees would be excluded from bringing claims as a result of this 
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change.162  The UK, by deciding to reduce the scope of protection, chose to disregard the 
views of the ILO Tripartite Committee and the CESR. Indeed, the UK Government may 
consider that it can act with impunity using national law relying on the limitations in 
Article 30 and the language in Article 2 of Protocol No 30 concerning the UK and 
Poland. Moreover, the order of the Court of Justice in Nagy163 indicates that an employee 
in the UK affected by this change would have no recourse under EU law regardless of the 
Protocol. Nevertheless, the UK may be in serious breach of international law by acting 
retrogressively to weaken the protection of workers from unjust dismissal. As noted in 
CII above, the duty of State parties, including the UK, under Article 6 of the UN ICESCR 
on the right to work includes safeguarding the protection of workers against unfair 
dismissal. In its General Comment No 18 on Article 6, the CESCR stressed the 
SURJUHVVLYHUHDOLVDWLRQRI WKHULJKWDQGFRQFOXGHGWKDW LIDQ\µGHOLEHUDWHO\UHWURJUHVVLYH
VWHSVDUH WDNHQ¶6WDWHSDUWLHVKDYH WKHEXUGHQRISURYLQJ WKDW Whey have considered all 
alternatives in the context of the ICESCR as a whole and the use of maximum available 
resources. 
 6WDWHVFDQDOVRH[FOXGHDWKLUGJURXSRIµZRUNHUVHQJDJHGRQDFDVXDOEDVLVIRUD
VKRUW SHULRG¶.164 Guidance from the ECSR is somewhat ambiguous on this point. 
According to the ECSR, all workers who have signed an employment contract are 
entitled to protection in the event of termination of employment.165 The language 
suggests that States have a margin of discretion to exclude many workers who do not 
KDYHVWDQGDUGFRQWUDFWVRIHPSOR\PHQWRUIRUPDOµHPSOR\HH¶VWDWXV 
 There is also scope for States to exclude workers whose terms of employment are 
JRYHUQHG E\ µVSHFLDO DUUDQJHPHQWV¶ ZKLFK SURYLGH SURWHFWLRQ DW OHDVW HTXLYDOHQW WR WKH
protection afforded under the ILO Convention subject to consultation with the social 
partners.166 )LQDOO\6WDWHVPD\H[FOXGHZRUNHUVZKHUHµVSHFLDOSUREOHPVRIDVXEVWDQWLDO
QDWXUH¶ DULVH LQ WKH OLJKW RI WKH SDUWLFXODU FRQGLWLRQV RI HPSOR\PHQW RI WKH ZRUNHUV
concerneGµRUWKHVL]HDQGWKHQDWXUHRIWKHXQGHUWDNLQJ¶WKDWHPSOR\VWKHPDOVRVXEMHFW
to consultation with the social partners.167 As the ILO Tripartite Committee decision 
concerning France demonstrates, the flexibility permitted by the latter does not allow for 
a general exclusion of small businesses from the Convention.168 
 
V  Remedies 
 
Art 47 of the Charter reinforces the principle of effective remedies that is well known in 
EU labour law. The asymmetric power relationship between the employer and the worker 
requires strong and effective remedies for violation of fundamental social rights. In the 
FRQWH[WRI(8HTXDOLW\ODZWKHQDWLRQDOFRXUWPXVWLPSRVHDSHQDOW\VXFKDVWRµJXDUDQWHH
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real and effective judicial protection ... it must also have a real deterrent effect on the 
HPSOR\HU¶169 7KH SULQFLSOH RI µHIIHFWLYH SURSRUWLRQDWH DQG GLVVXDVLYH¶ SHQDOWLHV LV
becoming standard in EU labour law directives.170 The worker who is deprived of their 
livelihood following a dismissal that they consider to be unjust is in the greatest need of 
procedural fairness and an effective remedy. 
 Under Article 10 of the ILO Convention the remedies are reinstatement or the 
payment of adequate compensation or such other relief as maybe appropriate. According 
to the CESR, in its case law on the equivalent provision in Article 24(b) RESC, the 
worker who has been unjustly dismissed should be reimbursed for financial losses 
incurred between the date of dismissal and the decision of the appeal body.171 In addition, 
FRPSHQVDWLRQVKRXOGEHRIDµKLgh enough level to dissuade the employer and make good 
WKHGDPDJHVXIIHUHGE\WKHHPSOR\HH¶172 
 Reinstatement reverses the dismissal by correcting the injustice. The worker 
returns to the same job, or a comparable job, with arrears of pay, as if there had been no 
dismissal.173 The option of reinstatement under the ILO Convention is heavily 
circumscribed. Only bodies that are empowered under national law to order or propose 
reinstatement are required to consider this option. Even if these bodies are empowered to 
RUGHU UHLQVWDWHPHQW WKH\ PD\ ILQG WKDW LW LV QRW µSUDFWLFDEOH¶ 7KHVH PDWWHUV DUH OHIW WR
µQDWLRQDO ODZ DQG SUDFWLFH¶ 2QFH DJDLQ WKH IRUPXODWLRQ RI µQDWLRQDO ODZ DQG SUDFWLFH¶
renders the reinstatement remedy nugatory except in those legal orders, such as Italy, that 
have hitherto taken it seriously because they UHFRJQLVH WKH ZRUNHU¶V LQWHUHVW LQ MRE
security.174 In the UK the Employment Tribunal is required to always consider the 
remedy of reinstatement first but will only order it if the employee wishes to be reinstated 
DQG µLW LV SUDFWLFDEOH IRU WKH HPSOR\HU WR FRPSO\ ZLWK WKH RUGHU¶175 In 2011-12 
reinstatement or re-engagement was awarded in just five out of 5,100 cases where the 




Article 30 on the right to protection against unjustified dismissal has an enigmatic 
quality. The µfundamental principle of justification¶ is firmly established at the UN, the 
ILO and the Council of Europe. It is the most salient of fundamental social rights 
because, perhaps more directly than any comparable right in the Charter, it asserts the 
principle that labour is not a commodity or article of commerce.177 It has been invoked 
purposively by the European Court of Human Rights when interpreting the ECHR and 
yet there is a void at EU level. Neither the Commission, which has the imperative to act 
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on a clear legal basis, nor the Court of Justice, which has a duty to interpret and apply 
Article 30 in the context of a wide range of legislation where it is, at least, incidentally, 
relevant, has been prepared to give it meaning in EU law. By contrast, the freedom to 
conduct a business is now strongly rooted in the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice and 
being applied to limit the scope of EU labour law directives.   
 Perhaps the best explanation for the enigma of Article 30 is a dual identity crisis. 
The first identity crisis is internal to Article 30 and the norms from which it is sourced. In 
seeking to balance such a multitude of interests ± job security, the managerial 
prerogative, and the needs of society - it lacks a clear focus. Its limitations and 
derogations exclude millions of casual and short-term workers who are the most 
vulnerable to the risk of unjust dismissal. Member States are unravelling decades of 
employment protection without giving Article 30 a second glance.  
 The second identity crisis is within the EU. Is the EU serious about balancing the 
economic and social dimensions of integration? What does the mishmash of flexibility 
and security ± so-FDOOHGµIOH[LFXULW\¶± really mean for those inside and outside the labour 
market? There are some who regard job security as an anomaly and Article 30 as 
anachronistic and outmoded when 50% or more of young people in southern Europe are 
out of work. An alternative view, however, is that the economic crisis shines a light on 
the need for stronger international labour standards respected and promoted in EU law. 
Research has shown that dismantling the legal protection of workers facing termination 
of employment has been inefficient in terms of economic recovery and has undermined 
productivity.178 The ILO has identified the termination of employment instruments as 
among the most relevant of its norms at a time of global economic crisis when stability is 
needed to protect livelihoods, reconcile work and private life and maintain social 
peace.179   
 It is time for Article 30 to cease to be an enigma. What this chapter has shown is 
that there is plenty of guidance in international law to give it greater clarity and meaning. 
Even in the absence of a core unjust dismissal measure at EU level, there are sufficient 
interconnections between Article 30 and existing norms across the breadth of EU social 
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